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ABSTRACT
By tackling shared problems through concerted policies, the European Union
(EU) is thought to have a superior output legitimacy. However, EU policies
change as they are being ‘customised’ during the implementation process.
How do such patterns of ‘differentiated implementation’ affect EU
governance in practice? While some studies highlight the danger of ‘watering
down’ the objectives of EU law, others emphasise the role of decentralised
problem-solving. We analyse how customisation affects states’ practical
compliance with EU anti-discrimination, environmental, and justice and home
affairs directives in 27 member states (excluding Croatia) between 2007 and
2013. The findings show that customised density (higher number of rules than
prescribed by the EU directives) reduces practical compliance. Conversely,
customised restrictiveness (stricter requirements than the EU directives)
improves practical compliance. In contrast to earlier implementation research,
we conclude that literal implementation is not the best form to ensure
practical implementation.
KEYWORDS Customisation; differentiated implementation; Europeanisation; gold-plating; over-
compliance; practical compliance
Introduction
Given relatively low levels of democratic inclusivity in European Union (EU)
politics, its capacity to effectively achieve policy outcomes is a key source
of legitimacy for citizens (Majone 1999; Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 2013;
Strebel et al., 2018). It is therefore surprising that the output legitimacy of
EU governance receives much less empirical scholarly scrutiny than its
input side. Underlying its unique multilevel governance structure is the
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expectation that EU policies will induce changes in the behaviour of decen-
tralised implementers, which are needed to solve shared policy problems.
Moreover, member states routinely interpret and change EU policies when
transposing them into national law, a process that we refer to as customisa-
tion (Fink & Ruffing, 2017; Logmani et al., 2017; Thomann, 2019). For instance,
Directive 2001/51/EC requires member states to prosecute carriers who trans-
port illegal immigrants into EU territories. However, not all countries explicitly
ensure that imposed sanctions do not decrease the protection of asylum
seekers; and many governments only foresee a subset of possible sanctions.
Beyond legal compliance with EU policies, these more fine-grained, diverse
patterns of implementation are widespread but under-researched
(Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017).
Furthermore, as Treib (2014, p. 29) states, ‘we have as yet comparatively
little evidence on the extent to which there is non-compliance beyond trans-
position and on the factors that are conducive to effective application and
enforcement’. Thus, ‘a directive can be perfectly transposed into national
legislation, but this does not necessarily lead to practical implementation
as well’ (Versluis, 2007, p. 51). Empirical studies support the conjecture that
legal and practical compliance are ‘decoupled’ (Falkner et al., 2005; Versluis,
2007; Zhelyazkova et al., 2016, 2018).
The empirical question remains, then, how domestic adaptations of EU
rules (i.e., customisation) affect their implementation in practice. Just as
differentiated integration enables member states to opt in or out of EU pol-
icies, it is important to study ‘differentiations’ in national responses to EU
rules because, ultimately, any EU policy needs to be implemented by the rel-
evant national institutions (Jordan, 1997). Therefore, this study asks: how do
different dimensions of customisation affect states’ practical compliance with
EU law?
Addressing this question contributes to theoretical debates on the inter-
actions between EU legislation, domestic policies and practice. The literature
on better regulation treats non-literal interpretations of EU rules as a poten-
tial threat as it can create unnecessary red tape, hamper the competitiveness
of businesses in the single market, or be a symptom of blame avoidance or
blame-shifting (Baldwin et al., 2010; Jans et al., 2009; Radaelli & Meuwese,
2009; Voermans, 2009). Conversely, theories of multilevel governance view
customisation as a problem-solving strategy that facilitates adaptations of
centrally decided policies to the local context and enhances their acceptance
among target groups (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Matland, 1995).
Our key argument is that in order to test these opposing views, we need to
distinguish between customisation as changes in the density or the restric-
tiveness of EU rules through national legislation. This well-established distinc-
tion between different dimensions of changes in regulatory outputs (Knill
et al., 2012; Schaffrin et al., 2015) not only informs the measurement of
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customisation (see Thomann, 2019), but it also matters for understanding its
effects. We derive hypotheses that link two distinct dimensions of customisa-
tion with practical compliance, while accounting for legal compliance, dom-
estic politics and EU policy characteristics.
Our empirical analysis constitutes the first scholarly attempt at systematic
comparative assessment of the relationship between customisation and prac-
tical compliance in 27 EU member states (excluding Croatia) and across three
policy areas: Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), Social Policy, and Environment.
In line with our key argument, we find that whereas customised density
increases the likelihood of states’ non-compliance in practice, higher levels
of customised restrictiveness are generally conducive to full practical compli-
ance. These findings support theories of multi-level governance underscoring
that the practical impact of EU rules is mediated by regulatory differentiations
beyond legal compliance.
Legal compliance, customisation, and practical compliance
The question why EU member do (not) comply with EU law has been exten-
sively researched with respect to member states’ transposition of EU Direc-
tives into national legislation (Treib, 2014). Correct transposition means
that EU directives are incorporated in national legislation in a way that is com-
patible with the EU objectives (Zhelyazkova et al., 2016) Table 1.
Table 1. Legal compliance, customisation, and practical compliance.













Substantive legal conformity of
national rules with EU rules
Customisation
Extent to which national rules
differ from EU rule:





















. activities of administrative
actors conform with EU
objectives
. member states implement
effective & dissuasive sanctions
against non-compliance &
efficient court proceedings
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 3
However, legal compliance does not capture the full process of translating
policy into action (Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017; Versluis, 2007). Instead,
customisation reflects the more fine-grained patterns of how countries use
their discretion to adapt policies to local circumstances during transposition
(Thomann, 2019). Customisation differs from legal compliance because it
refers to the extent to which member states change the EU rules when trans-
posing them into national law. Even if countries comply with EU rules, they
can customise EU Directives to a considerable extent in order to adjust
them to domestic contexts (Fink & Ruffing, 2017; Logmani et al., 2017;
Thomann, 2019; Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017). These adaptations are
highly political, as they offer opportunities for member states to influence
and shape EU policies in line with their preferences and capacities (Richard-
son, 2012). Because customisation offers more subtle and often non-punish-
able ways for member states to ‘have it their own way’, it differs conceptually
and empirically from legal compliance (Thomann, 2019).
In essence, customisation refers to vertical policy changes along the
implementation chain. When comparing differences between EU and dom-
estic rules, we use well-established approaches to classifying regulatory
outputs and temporal and spatial changes therein to measure customisation
(Schaffrin et al., 2015; Thomann, 2019). Customisation is defined as the
changes that EU rules undergo in their density and restrictiveness during
transposition. Added customised density refers to the number of national
rules in addition to the EU requirements—the ‘quantity’ of national regu-
lation. For instance, member states can implement several different types
of financial sanctions on carriers facilitating illegal immigration foreseen in
Directive 2001/51/EC, while the directive requires the implementation of
only one type of sanctions. However, adding sanctions does not necessarily
increase the restrictiveness of EU legislation, unless member states specify
how these should be applied. Additional rules could also decrease the restric-
tiveness of a policy, if they concern exemptions from the EU requirements,
increasig the discretion of target groups.
Whereas customised density does not refer to substantive aspects of regu-
latory change, customised restrictiveness reflects how domestic rules differ
from the EU legislation in content: i.e., the extent to which the state intervenes
into and restricts the behaviour of target groups (Knill et al., 2012; Thomann &
Zhelyazkova, 2017). For instance, member states can specify the minimum or
maximum amount of financial penalties (or both) to be paid by unauthorised
carriers of refugees (as prescribed by Directive 2001/51/EC), thus restricting
the freedom of maneuver of national bureaucracies to set these limits
themselves.
Density and restrictiveness can be added to EU rules (by implementing
more rules or formulating stricter requirements than an EU directive). Alterna-
tively, member states can adopt fewer or less restrictive rules. For example,
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states can choose not to transpose some of the conditions for granting resi-
dence permits to third-country nationals or omit certain definitions from the
directive (less density). Whereas such omissions can result in legal non-com-
pliance, they do not necessarily exacerbate practical implementation. By par-
tially transposing the EU directives, policy-makers either consciously or
unwittingly delegate implementing authorities to national bureaucrats to
fill in the policy gaps at the implementation stage. Recent research shows
that implementers are more likely to comply with the EU directives in practice
when national legislation misses important EU provisions (Zhelyazkova et al.,
2018). Some omissions can even broaden the scope of national measures
beyond the target groups defined in EU directives.
Contrary to legal compliance and customisation, practical implementation
refers to the process in which rules are enforced and applied by the relevant
administrative actors and target groups —not through intentions ‘on paper’,
but through activities ‘in action’ (Thomann, 2019; Treib, 2014; Versluis, 2007).
While practical implementation can result in diverse outcomes (Bondarouk &
Mastenbroek, 2018), we seek to explain the practical compliancewith EU rules
by member states.
The existing empirical evidence about the link between legal and practical
compliance is limited and inconclusive (Knill et al., 2012). While it has been
suggested that customisation might prove the missing link (Thomann & Zhe-
lyazkova, 2017), the relationship between customisation and practical com-
pliance has hardly been studied empirically. Aggregated customisation
levels have a strongly context-dependent effect on practical implementation
(Thomann, 2019). We need to theorise both possible positive and negative
effects of customisation and control for legal compliance levels as well as
country- and sector-specific patterns (Treib, 2014).
Watering down or problem-solving?
The key question of this study is how customisation affects practical compli-
ance with EU rules.
Based on EU’s ‘better regulation’ agenda, reducing ‘unnecessary over-
regulation’ among other things aims to ‘increase competitiveness by minimis-
ing regulatory burdens and providing efficient regulations’ (Radaelli &
Meuwese, 2009, p. 639). This implies transposition should be restricted to
what is necessary to comply with the EU’s minimum requirements (Voermans,
2009), where customisation is not desirable.
Two possible mechanisms underlie the negative effect of customisation.
First, by extensively changing an EU directive, member states create new
rules that essentially differ from the initial EU policy. As a result, national
implementers need to consider both the EU directives and national measures
(Dörrenbächer, 2017). The increased divergence between the national and EU
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requirements increases the number of possible implementation alternatives
creating ambiguity which policy should be followed in practice. Second, cus-
tomisation is often associated with red tape ‘resulting in unnecessary burdens
and competitive disadvantages for domestic businesses’ (Voermans, 2009, p.
8). Administrative burdens create considerable costs (psychological and
others) for actors who implement them (Burden et al., 2012). Target groups
and businesses who feel disadvantaged might exert pressure on bureaucrats
to implement the rules differently. Moreover, red tape can favour corruption
(Dunlop & Radaelli, 2019) and divert resources from effective practical com-
pliance. A lack of perceived meaningfulness or legitimacy of the customised
policy might make domestic bureaucrats reluctant to implement these rules
(Hartlapp, 2014; May, 2015).
However, case-study evidence suggests only limited negative effects and
sometimes positive effects of legal ‘over-implementation’ (Falkner et al., 2005;
Jans et al., 2009; Thomann, 2019; Treib 2014; Versluis, 2007; Voermans, 2009).
We argue that to better understand the effects of customisation, we should
make a distinction between customised density and restrictiveness (Knill
et al., 2012; Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017). The effects of customisation
may vary depending on whether member states add ‘extra requirements’
to an EU rule (Versluis, 2007) (the number of additional national rules relative
to the original EU policy), or whether they lay down stricter requirements on
target groups (the ‘substance’ of national rules). The effects of these two dis-
tinct dimensions of customisation on practical compliance are yet to be
empirically tested.
More rules, more problems?
The inclusion of more rules (density) introduces ambiguity in the implemen-
tation process. This ambiguity is the result of a control deficit: member states
‘doing things their own way’, by adding special rules or creating exemptions,
can lead to a watering down of the original intentions of EU policies (Knill,
2015).
Customised density increases the number of rules that need to be
implemented by the relevant national institutions. Consequently, higher
number of rules increases the chance that national implementers will fail to
implement at least one rule correctly either because of capacity limitations
or because the additional requirements deviate from their policy preferences.
First, increasing the number of rules enhances the costs of implementation,
as national implementers need to take necessary actions regarding the
additional requirements or exemptions. As the number of necessary
implementation activities grows, the possibility for implementation failure
is expected to increase. A higher number of rules also magnifies the
number of actors involved in the implementation process, who could have
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diverging preferences regarding implementation (Baldwin et al., 2010; Sabatier
& Mazmanian, 1980). Second, additional rules increase the amount of resources
that are needed for implementation and monitoring compliance. National
legislators may choose to prioritise monitoring the implementation of some
rules and fail to detect and prosecute compliance problems with others.
Third, when member states add rules that were not included in the original
EU directive, they create uncertainty among national bureaucrats whether
they should follow the EU or national legislation (Dörrenbächer, 2017).
Accordingly, added customised density is expected to negatively affect
practical compliance, by blurring the original intentions of EU rules and con-
tributing to the growth of regulation (Radaelli & Meuwese, 2009), thus com-
plicating the implementation process.
‘Watering down’ hypothesis (H1):
Higher levels of customised density are negatively associated with practical
compliance.
Conversely, increased density could also reflect policy-makers’ incentives
to take a more proactive approach to practical compliance, where additional
rules serve to ‘stack the deck’ in favour of national preferences. National legis-
lators sometimes add rules to clarify ambiguous EU directives, which can
facilitate practical implementation (Knill & Lenschow, 1998). The effect of
density on implementation might thus be conditional on the preferences
and objectives of governments, who specify the EU rules to ensure proper
practical implementation.
We acknowledge the relevance of such indirect effects. However, we focus
on the direct relationship between density and practical implementation,
while controlling for government motivations and bureaucratic capacities.
Whereas additional rules can certainly clarify ambiguous EU directives, regu-
latory quantity on its own does not elucidate the conditions for practical com-
pliance. For example, when transposing the EU equal treatment directives,
many member states added exemptions to the norm of non-discrimination
for certain occupations (e.g., police and army). However, without specifying
the conditions for difference in treatment, the new rules create ambiguity
about the application of these directives and ‘water down’ their core objec-
tives to prevent discrimination in employment conditions.
The benefits of restrictiveness
Customisation can also have positive effects on policy outcomes (Thomann,
2019). Jans et al. (2009, pp. 434–435) even argue that some EU policies are
actually intended to be ‘minimal rules’ which member states are allowed to
exceed:
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the whole system of environmental protection within EC policies is based on
the assumption that Member States would make use of Article 176 EC Treaty
[which foresees the possibility for Member States to take stricter measures]. (…)
This perspective refers to the content rather than the quantity of regulation,
and resonates with the idea of problem-solving in multilevel governance
(Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Lodge & Wegrich, 2014; Thomann & Sager, 2017;
Trein et al., 2019). Regulatory stringency puts pressure on implementers
and target groups to make the EU policies work (Knill et al., 2012;
Thomann, 2019). Far from watering down original policy intentions, custo-
mised restrictiveness reduces the ambiguity of EU rules by specifying the obli-
gations of national implementers. The additional clarity provided through
substantive adaptations can enhance the sense of acceptance among practi-
cal policy implementers, and should facilitate practical compliance (Hooghe &
Marks, 2003; Knill, 2015):
‘Problem-solving’ hypothesis (H2a)
Higher levels of customised restrictiveness are positively associated with practi-
cal compliance.
However, it is also possible that restrictiveness has a negative effect on prac-
tical implementation, if more restrictive transposition increases the costs of
implementation. For example, by limiting the implementation options, restric-
tiveness removes the flexibility of national bureaucracies to adjust the EU rules
according to their capacities and preferences. Highly specific and precise rules
can raise controversies among implementers, who disagree with the EU
requirements. Furthermore, some implementers may face difficulties comply-
ing with very precise high standards that do not allow for divergent policy out-
comes. For example, not all member states are able to curb CO2 emissions to
the same degree and flexible transposition allows national implementers to
search for alternative solutions to a policy problem.
Therefore, we consider a contrasting hypothesis on the effect of restrictive-
ness on practical compliance.
‘Limited freedom’ hypothesis (H2b)
Higher levels of customised restrictiveness are negatively associated with
practical compliance.
Data and methods
We systematically compare the implementation of EU policies in the areas of
JHA (10 Directives), Social Policy (4 Directives), and Environment (3 Direc-
tives). Including diverse policy areas enables us to identify sector-specific
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patterns and increases the external validity of our findings (Gerring, 2008). All
three policy areas allow member states to go further than what the EU mini-
mally requires. At the same time, they also reflect different constellations of
domestic actors and preferences. For example, environmental policies have
individual actors or businesses as their main target group, whereas JHA
and social policies primarily require national immigration authorities to
take action. To ensure that the results are not driven by sector-specific
dynamics, we also tested our hypotheses separately for each area.
Table A1 in the appendix provides information about the EU directives,
and the data sources for customisation and practical compliance. We only
focus on EU directives because other types of EU legislation (e.g., regulations
and decisions) are not subject to national transposition and therefore, do not
undergo customisation. Furthermore, we rely on conformity-checking reports
prepared by external experts contracted by the EU Commission (Zhelyazkova
et al., 2016). Based on these reports, we obtained data on both customisation
and practical compliance for 277 observations (directive*country dyads). Fur-
thermore, we remain cautious about generalising our findings, given the
small number of Social Policy and Environment directives. Nevertheless, the
uniqueness of the data enables a first quantitative analysis of the relationship
between distinct dimensions of customisation and practical compliance.
Measurement of practical compliance and method of analysis
To obtain comparable information about member states’ implementation
activities we employ a novel data-set on practical compliance whose
content and data collection procedure have been extensively described else-
where (Zhelyazkova et al., 2016). Information about practical compliance was
extracted from external evaluation reports prepared by consultancies that aim
to provide in-depth analysis of member states’ implementation. Conformity
studies cover the implementation performance in both Central and Eastern
European (CEE) and EU-15 member states in the period between 2007 and
2013. Thus, the analysis excludes Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013.
The evaluations of practical compliance are specific to the requirements of
a particular provision in an EU directive. Whereas Zhelyazkova et al. (2016)
measure practical compliance as the share of correctly applied provisions rela-
tive to all evaluated provisions in a directive, this study focuses on a smaller
number of EU directives, resulting in limited variation and a skewed distri-
bution in the share of practical compliance. Therefore, we distinguish
between different categories of practical compliance: low, limited and full com-
pliance. Full compliance reflects situations where national experts did not
encounter any practical issues related to the implementation of an EU direc-
tive. Limited compliance means that national implementation resulted in
onemajor practical problem, while low practical compliance indicates multiple
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major implementation problems. The measurement closely resonates with
qualitative ideas about practical compliance (Falkner et al., 2005). Further-
more, we also acknowledge that information about practical compliance
could be affected by characteristics of the assessment reports. Therefore,
the analysis accounts for the number of sources providing information
about practical implementation and the length of the reports. Despite these
caveats, previous research has shown that external assessment reports are
highly comparable, while offering a novel tool to analysemember states’ com-
pliance in a quantitative framework (Zhelyazkova et al., 2016, 2018).
We employ multinomial logit as the method of analysis. Alternative
methods, such as ordered logit and generalised ordered logit rely on more
restrictive assumptions about the effects of the independent variables
across different categories of the dependent variable. As a robustness
check, we replicated the analysis using ordered logit and generalised
ordered logit models (see online appendix).
Measurement of customisation
Our analysis of customisation is based on conformity reports that contain so-
called ‘tables of correspondence’ (TOCs) including the directive provisions,
the domestic transposition measure, and an evaluation of a state’s level of
conformity. The tables also include detailed information about the nature
of transposition outputs and whether they exceed the requirements of a
directive (Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017).
Customised density (H1) refers to the number of rules (policies and/or
instruments) that are added to or removed from an EU provision in the trans-
position measures (e.g., scope restrictions, requirements, conditions, exemp-
tions). A domestic rule customises an EU provision with more density, if it
adds at least one new element in the transposition process. Alternatively, a
member state may also remove density from the EU directive. For example,
Finland and the Netherlands did not transpose optional provisions from
the Directive 2003/86/EC on family reunification that would allow immigra-
tion authorities to reject applications for entry and residence on grounds of
public health. We counted the number of times that an expert mentioned
an addition to (coded as 1) or an omission (coded as −1) from a specific EU
provision. Density levels range between −2 and 4 at the provision level. At
the directive level, we took the average density score of all evaluated direc-
tive provisions which is a continuous variable ranging between −2 and 2.
Customised restrictiveness (H2a & H2b) is based on expert assessments that
identified transposition outcomes as either more (coded as 1) or less restric-
tive (−1; hence, more discretionary to the relevant addressees) than the
respective EU provision. For example, external experts indicated that some
member states implemented more flexible requirements for processing
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asylum applications and granted more rights to refugees (e.g., healthcare
exceeding emergency cases). Other member states further restricted refu-
gees’ rights relative to the JHA Directives by requesting additional documents
for asylum applications. Customised restrictiveness is coded as 0, if a pro-
vision was neither assessed as more restrictive nor as less restrictive than
the EU provision. The most obvious manifestation of this is literal (equivalent)
transposition. Similar to customised density, we operationalise restrictiveness
at the directive level as the average score of restrictiveness across all evalu-
ated provisions in a directive (it ranges between −2 and 2).
Other independent variables
Our analysis includes policy-area binary variables to account for differences in
practical compliance across EU sectors. Furthermore, we control for directive-
level characteristics related to the discretion that EU directives grant national
administrations and policy complexity. A directive’s discretion is measured as
the share of provisions that grant implementation freedom to member states
(i.e., ‘may’ clauses) relative to all directive provisions (Thomson & Torenvlied,
2011). We measure policy complexity as the number of recitals preceding the
text of an EU directive (Treib, 2014). We also control for a member state’s level
of legal compliance with an EU directive (Zhelyazkova et al., 2016), measured
as the share of correctly transposed provisions relative to all relevant pro-
visions in a directive. ‘Relevant provisions’ refer to all articles or sub-articles
that were assessed as separate issues in the reports and were evaluated as
either correctly implemented or not.
We acknowledge that dimensions of customisation and practical compli-
ance can be influenced by similar domestic factors. For example, states
that lack administrative capacity to adopt more restrictive measures during
the transposition process are also less likely to comply with the EU rules in
practice (Knill & Lenschow, 1998; Treib, 2014). To measure differences in
member states’ capacity limitations (Börzel et al., 2010), we employ the ‘Gov-
ernment Effectiveness’ indicator from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
Database. ‘Government Effectiveness’ reflects the quality of public and civil
services at the year of a member state’s directive transposition. In a similar
vein, governments that have incentives to deviate from the EU directives
are likely to customise national legislation so that policy outcomes favour
their own political objectives (Thomann 2019). Incentives to deviate,
however, could also lead to non-compliance (Mastenbroek & Kaeding,
2006; Thomson et al., 2007). Thus, we control for government preferences
towards the EU. We first identified the relevant governments and their
party affiliations based on data from the reports. Information about govern-
ments’ positions towards the EU was obtained from the Chapel Hill Expert
Surveys (Bakker et al., 2015).
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Another factor that could influence both customisation and practical com-
pliance is the number of veto players involved in the transposition process
(Zhelyazkova et al., 2016). A higher number of national policy-makers
increases the likelihood that at least some legislators will favour adding
extra elements to the EU rules or will oppose more restrictive transposition
(Thomann, 2019). Veto players also constrain the ability of national actors
to effectively comply with the EU requirements (Börzel et al., 2010; Haverland,
2000). We employ two measures for veto players. First, we count the number
of ministers involved in the adoption of the transposition measures based on
the assessment reports (Zhelyazkova et al., 2016). Second, we control for the
extent to which governments consult with civil society organisations (CSOs)
in the adoption of national legislation (CSO consultation). The measure is
taken from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2017) and records the
extent to which governments routinely give voice to CSOs in the policy-
making process.
Finally, we control for characteristics of the assessment reports that could
potentially bias the estimates on practical compliance. For example, longer
reports are likely to provide more detailed information. Similarly, the use of
multiple sources increases the likelihood that at least one of the assessments
will describe compliance problems. Thus, we control for the length of the
reports (number of pages allotted to a particular country) and the number
of sources regarding practical compliance. Table 2A in the online appendix
describes the variables employed in the analysis.
The effects of customisation on practical compliance
We first examine whether there are any patterns in customised density and
restrictiveness across member states. Figure 1 depicts the average levels of
customised density and restrictiveness. Based on our data-set, there are no
significant differences in the extent to which member states customise EU
directives regarding the three policy areas. The only exception is Latvia,
which shows negative average density. However, most member states on
average add extra rules to the EU directives during transposition (Figure 1;
left-hand side). Conversely, member states’ tendencies to adopt more strin-
gent legislation are more ambiguous. Whereas Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany,
Spain and Italy transpose EU legislation more restrictively, other countries
show more diversity in customising the EU directives (Figure 1; right-hand
side). Thus, although member states frequently modify the EU rules during
transposition, they do so in different ways. Furthermore, we observe more
variation in density and restrictiveness within member states than across
countries. This finding suggests that customisation practices are issue-
specific and are driven by different sectorial logics within the EU member
states.
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Table 2 presents the analysis of the effects of customised restrictiveness,
and customised density on practical compliance. Models 1 and 3 estimate
the likelihood of limited (i.e., only one major gap in practical compliance)
Figure 1. Average levels of customised density and restrictiveness across member
states.









Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.)
Density (added rules) −0.02 (0.26) 0.64* (0.28) 0.31 (0.32) 0.98* (0.41)
Restrictiveness −0.11 (0.21) −0.66* (0.32) −0.42 (0.33) −1.02* (0.40)
Justice & Home
Affairs (=1)
0.57 (1.35) −2.45 (2.02)
Social Policy (=1) −0.62 (0.67) −2.62*** (0.79)
Legal compliance −0.20 (0.96) −4.25** (1.31)
Bureaucratic
efficiency
−0.42 (0.34) −0.25 (0.40)
Government EU
support
−0.27 (0.25) −0.19 (0.29)
Directive discretion −2.68** (0.92) 0.21 (1.12)
Directive complexity
(N recitals)
−0.02 (0.03) −0.07+ (0.04)
CSO consultation 0.58** (0.19) 0.25 (0.34)
Number of ministers 0.33** (0.12) 0.33* (0.15)
Length of the report 0.02 (0.06) 0.15* (0.07)
Number of sources 0.57 (0.75) 0.07 (1.00)
Constant −0.78*** (0.17) −1.15*** (0.26) −0.54 (3.49) 4.36 (4.17)
Observations 272 236
Pseudo R^2 0.024 0.151
LR chi2 −270.957 −208.917
Notes: Reference category: Full compliance; Policy area reference category: Environment; Standard errors
in parentheses (clustered in directives); + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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relative to full practical compliance (reference category). Models 2 and 4
compare low practical compliance (multiple major practical problems) to
full conformity with the EU directives.
In line with H1 and H2a, the findings suggest that separate aspects of cus-
tomisation – density and restrictiveness –have distinct effects on practical
compliance. More precisely, higher levels of customised density increase
the chance that EU member states will experience multiple problems at
the practical implementation stage. Conversely, the likelihood of low practical
compliance decreases, when national policy-makers transpose the EU rules
more stringently. Restrictiveness and density do not significantly affect the
likelihood of limited practical compliance.
The estimates support the ‘watering down’ hypothesis that higher levels of
customised density significantly increase the likelihood that member states
will encounter multiple issues during the implementation process. To
better illustrate this finding, Figure 2 (left) shows the changes in the prob-
ability of full and low practical compliance (more than one implementation
gap) at different levels of customised density. The figure shows that when
member states omit (on average) two rules from an EU directive during trans-
position, the probability of full compliance is 0.74, while the probability of low
compliance is only 0.06. This situation pertains to the Latvian transposition of
directive 2001/81/EC on emission ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants.
By excluding requirements that pollutants should have ‘adverse effects on
the environment’ beyond a critical point, the Latvian government increased
the scope of the directive. This omission facilitated implementation, as
Figure 2. The effect of customisation (density and restrictiveness) on the probability of
full and low practical compliance.
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national authorities could forbid all air pollutants in sensitive areas, instead of
having to continuously monitor whether emissions reach critical values. Con-
versely, the probability of full practical compliance decreases to 0.29, when
member states include two additional rules in the transposition of an EU
directive, while the chance of encountering multiple implementation gaps
increases to 0.49. In particular, when transposing directive 2001/51/EC
Poland and Spain added three kinds of financial penalties for carriers of
illegal immigrants. The higher number of rules, however, creates confusion
about the circumstances under which either of the three penalties would
apply, making it more difficult to enforce the rules in practice. This finding
is robust across different policy sectors and model specifications (see
online appendix). It suggests that concerns about blurring the objectives of
EU policies and unnecessary regulation are justified, when examining the
amount (density) of national rules.
Conversely, the estimates in Table 2 show a significant negative effect of
customised restrictiveness on the likelihood of practical non-compliance
(low versus full compliance). In line with the problem-solving hypothesis
(H2a), customised restrictiveness is conducive to full practical compliance.
Instead, we do not find evidence that restrictiveness curbs practical
implementation either because it limits bureaucratic discretion or because
more concrete rules increase the costs of compliance (H2b). Figure 2 (right)
visualises this result. In situations where transposition measures are laxer
than the EU requirements, the probabilities of full and low compliance
(more than one implementation gap) are 0.23 and 0.53 respectively. These
probabilities reflect the less restrictive transposition of Directives 2000/43/
EC (on racial equality) and 2000/78/EC (on employment equality) by several
member states. In particular, national policy-makers allowed difference in
treatment based on the nature of the occupation (e.g., army, church). While
such exemptions are in line with the directive’s provisions, it is unclear
which types of occupational characteristics justify unequal treatment in prac-
tice. Conversely, the probability of full compliance increases to 0.74, when
national transposition is more concrete than the EU directives, while the prob-
ability of encountering multiple implementation issues decreases to 0.07. For
example, the French government adoptedmore stringent rules than Directive
2006/54/EC on gender equality, by specifying the obligations of employers
and employees to negotiate on the pay gap. This result supports our conjec-
ture that EU directives create ambiguities for national implementers that can
be resolved by specifying the requirementsdomestic actors need to fulfil.
The analysis supports the findings from previous research on EU compli-
ance. Member states that legally comply with EU directives are less likely to
experience multiple practical problems. Furthermore, member states
comply better with Social Policy than with Environment directives (Zhelyaz-
kova et al., 2016). Conversely, the number of ministers involved in the
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transposition process increases the likelihood of non-compliance at the
implementation stage. This result is in line with existing research on the nega-
tive impact of veto players on member states’ compliance (Börzel et al., 2010;
Haverland, 2000; Steunenberg, 2006).
The analysis also shows that directive-level discretion and CSO consul-
tation increase the chance of limited compliance, but they do not signifi-
cantly affect the likelihood of multiple implementation gaps. The results
underscore the ambivalent effect of discretion on implementation. On the
one hand, higher discretion facilitates compliance by increasing the range
of possible compliant national policies. On the other hand, discretion
creates uncertainty about the most appropriate policy alternative from the
pool of available options. Similarly, we expected that CSOs act as veto
players during implementation. However, CSO consultations could also
help governments tailor national transposition measures to the demands
of relevant target groups, increasing the chance that the latter will comply
with the transposed measures.
Robustness analysis
In the online appendix, we present descriptive analysis (Figure A1) and
findings for each separate policy area (Figures A2 & A3) and for different
values of legal compliance and government EU support (Table A4). These
robustness checks show that customised density and restrictiveness have
direct impact on practical compliance that is unimpeded by the political con-
siderations of national legislators. Moreover, the results remain robust for
different measures of practical non-compliance (e.g., number of practical pro-
blems) (Table A5) and when assuming ordered outcomes for practical non-
compliance (Table A6).
Differentiated EU policy implementation: ways ahead
Perspectives on differentiated EU integration typically rest on the assumption
that member states achieve compliance because the EU rules provide for
sufficient flexibility. However, the phenomena of compliance and customisa-
tion have never been studied in conjunction. Past research suggests that
levels of legal compliance insufficiently explain practical implementation in
the EU (Versluis, 2007; Zhelyazkova et al., 2016). We, therefore, analysed
how regulatory changes at the transposition stage affect the implementation
of EU directives in practice. In particular, our analysis shows that customisa-
tion matters for practical compliance. It is expected that fine-grained patterns
of vertical policy change are an essential element of problem-solving in the
EU policy-making process (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014; Richardson, 2012;
Thomann & Sager, 2017; Trein et al., 2019).
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Our findings suggest that the impact of customisation on practical compli-
ance depends on the nature of change: whether member states customise
the density or the restrictiveness of EU rules. More precisely, theresults
show that different dimensions of customisation have distinct and contrast-
ing effects on practical compliance. For example, adding rules to the EU pol-
icies (customised density) tends to adversely affect practical compliance.
Thus, higher number of domestic rules indeed complicate practical
implementation (Baldwin et al., 2010; Dunlop & Radaelli, 2019; Versluis,
2007). Conversely, we find that customised restrictiveness helps improve
practical compliance with EU policies. EU member states that change the
content of rules during transposition effectively solve shared policy problems
(Thomann & Sager2017; Thomann, 2019). These empirical insights are impor-
tant because the (intuitively appealing) idea that policy implementation in
the EU should generally stay as close as possible to the EU template currently
informs the EU better regulation agenda (Radaelli & Meuwese, 2009). Yet, as
our results show, this idea is empirically unfounded. Although legal compli-
ance tends to reduce practical compliance problems, the results of this
study suggest that EU rules do not directly translate into implementation
practices. Thus, in contrast to earlier research, we conclude that literal
implementation is not always the best form to ensure practical
implementation.
Moreover, the analysis identified a non-linear relationship between custo-
misation and practical compliance. More precisely, customisation alleviates
(restrictiveness) or enhances (density) only high levels of practical non-com-
pliance (when member states encounter multiple problems during the
implementation process). However, customised restrictiveness does not com-
pletely eliminate practical non-compliance. Whereas restrictiveness reduces
the likelihood that member states experience multiple compliance problems,
it does not eradicate the occurrence of an implementation problem (limited
compliance). Similarly, added regulatory density is only associated with mul-
tiple practical problems. These findings stress the intricacies of practical
implementation, where dimensions of customisation are only one out of
many explanations for (non-)compliance. In reality, practical problems
occur due to various factors and future research should shed more light on
the multitude of explanations that lead to the occurrence of practical non-
compliance. We should also bear in mind that practical compliance is not
yet a policy outcome. The relationship between practical compliance and
behavioural changes of societal target groups is a largely unexplored
territory.
Even more than legal compliance, practical compliance with EU policies is
a prerequisite for ensuring policy effectiveness and the output legitimacy of
EU multilevel governance (Scharpf, 1999; Schmidt, 2013). Our results show
that customisation can both impede and contribute to effective problem-
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solving in the EU. Differentiated implementation’ (Fink & Ruffing, 2017) can
lead to either watering down EU policy objectives, or to making European
integration a success in practice. Therefore, the outputs of EU governance
deserve more empirical scrutiny (Majone 1999; Strebel et al., 2018). Future
research should address not only how customisation affects practical compli-
ance, but also the link between differentiated integration, differentiation at
the level of transposition, and differentiation at the level of practical
implementation—beyond legal compliance.
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